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Abstract 
 
The radioactive fallout from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors accident and 
the ongoing threat of nuclear or radioactive terrorism have forced the need for urban 
radiological decontamination into the forefront. Many of the established decontamination 
techniques are not ideally suited for the urban milieu. One of the keys to maximize the 
effectiveness of long-term remediation and recovery in the urban environment is 
immediate mitigation within a few days of the incident and before a rain event.  
 The Integrated Wash-Aid, Treatment, and Emergency Reuse System (IWATERS) 
provides a potentially safe and effective method for early responders and remediation 
teams to perform decontamination operations in urban areas. The system is set up with 
water barriers to catch wash water coming off of the building, pumps are then used to 
move the water through a series of absorbent beds, ion exchange filter, and finally into a 
holding bladder for eventual reuse. The goal of this research was to characterize: filter 
bed sizes for the decontamination of a modeled city block, exposure rates pre and post 
decontamination, and equivalent dose to early responders.  
The research found that the expected cesium activity from an entire city block can 
be contained safely in a filter bed of approximately one cubic meter. Shielding of the 
filter bed brings exposure rates down to a negligible level and enables the filter beds to be 
deployed in multiple configurations. The highest estimated exposure rate at the working 
locations of 0.66 milliroentgen per hour is kept below the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission public exposure rate limit of 2 milliroentgen per hour. In addition, the 
v 
worst-case expected equivalent dose of 46 millirem for a person who was exposed at the 
middle of the street for the entire decontamination process is below the 5,000 millirem 
guideline of the Environmental Protection Agency protective action guide for emergency 
responders and the 5,000 millirem per year limit for occupational radiation workers set by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
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Radiological Decontamination in the Urban Environment Utilizing an Irreversible 
Wash-aid Recovery System 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background of the Problem  
 
   
The nuclear age brought a new technology into the world that forever altered the 
state of warfare and energy. In doing so, the nuclear age created a need to develop and 
implement decontamination and recovery procedures following intentional acts and 
accidents. The potential malicious use of radiological dispersal devices was recognized in 
the first United Nations document defining weapons of mass destruction [1]. During the 
testing of nuclear weapons, agencies began research into how to clean the environment. 
For clear safety reasons, nuclear tests have been conducted in remote locations with no 
predicted future to house any kind of permanent population. Many of the 
decontamination techniques developed by the nuclear remediation community have been 
intended for use in remote environmental cleanup or local controlled cleanup at a reactor 
site.  
A series of world events brought urban decontamination into the public 
consciousness. In 1979, a stuck valve at the Three Mile Island reactor led to the release of 
nuclear material near Middletown, Pennsylvania. Epidemiological studies have found 
that there have been no extra cancers caused by the release, the cleanup process still took 
14 years and cost $1 billion dollars [2]. Urban contamination following the Chernobyl 
disaster in 1986 has led to an exclusion zone that is still not populated 31 years later. The 
city of Pripyat once held over 49,000 people and now sits empty [3]. The remediation of 
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cities and the environment from the Fukushima Daichi release are still on-going and have 
produced significant interest and research into urban decontamination [4]. The cost of 
decontamination alone, not including disposal of waste, reached $13 billion as of 2016. 
All these incidents involved long term clean up that denied access to urban areas, used 
specialized personnel and equipment in the reactor areas, and generated large volumes of 
contaminated waste. On top of the risk presented from nuclear reactor accidents the threat 
of terrorism attack using radiological dispersal devices (RDD) or improvised nuclear 
devices (IND) continue to persist. The economic impact from an RDD is predicted to 
significantly outpace the effects of a similar conventional attack. Research has shown that 
an RDD attack in the business district of a medium sized city would result in 
approximately 18,000 lost jobs over the short term [5]. In order to reduce the negative 
consequences the contamination must be cleaned quickly and effectively.  
The Integrated Wash-Aid Treatment, Emergency Reuse System (IWATERS) is 
designed to help early responders mitigate negative outcomes following a release of 
radioactive material in an urban environment. The system quickly and efficiently 
removes the contamination before it can bind with building or road materials, enabling a 
faster return to normal operations and reduced radiation exposure for both emergency 
responders and the public.  The system is set up with water barriers to catch wash water 
coming off of the building.  Pumps are then used to move the water through a series of 
absorbent beds that are filled with material that has a high affinity for radioactive ions 
such as clay, the ions adsorb to the filter material and are removed from the wash water. 
The effluent is then sent through an ion exchange filter to remove any remaining 
radioactive ions and finally sent into a holding bladder for eventual reuse. See Figure 1 
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for a conceptual rendering of the IWATERS. The goal of the IWATERS is to reduce 
waste and exposure by integrating the wash and recovery to quickly remove the 
contamination from the urban area. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Depiction of the IWATERS 
Statement of the Problem 
  
 The IWATERS concept has been developed and tested both at the bench and pilot 
scale. The removal of the radioactive ions and transport from the surface of interest into 
the filter beds is fairly well characterized [6]. However, the dose to responders who are 
using the system and the expected external exposure rate reduction to the public from 
decontamination operations has not been characterized. The dose to the early responders 
will come initially from radioactive material that is deposited on the surface of the street 
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and buildings. As the material is washed into the filter bed the source of exposure will 
change from the surface of the buildings and become the filter beds themselves. 
Purpose of the Study  
 
 This research models the expected external exposure rate to cleanup personnel 
operating in an urban environment following an isotropic release of radioactive Cs-137 in 
the form of cesium chloride salt. For this hypothetical situation, an RDD detonation is 
described. The exposure rate modeling allows for the comparison of three different street 
decontamination methods, two different vertical decontamination filter bed options, 
estimates the percent reduction in exposure rate, and provides an estimate of early 
responder total exposure during the course of the mitigation operation.  
In addition, the principle of As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) still 
applies during emergency response situations. Leadership and guidance agencies are 
under an obligation to ensure that workers are protected to the maximum extent possible. 
Therefore, it is prudent to estimate exposure prior to fielding of IWATERS because there 
are multiple options for setting up and deploying the IWATERS. Exposure modeling 
allows rough bounds of acceptable operation to be established so that it may be turned 
into technical guidance.  
Significance of the Study  
 
 This is the first modeling to estimate exposure to cleanup personnel during use of 
the IWATERS. It is a needed step in for the implementation of a new technology.  In 
addition, the ionic wash mechanism of the IWATERS is an emerging form of radioactive 
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material decontamination and potentially offers health and economic improvements over 
traditional remediation methods.  
Significance to Leadership  
 
 Radioactive dispersal devices present a unique challenge for local emergency 
responders. The type of response changes instantly as soon as radioactive contamination 
is detected. The initial wave of response to secure the scene and rescue victims in the hot 
zone may occur before radioactive material is identified. However, due to the recognized 
threat of terrorism, the National Incident Response Framework has made an all-hazards 
approach to response the national standard [7]. If there is a potential that an emergency 
originated as a terrorist act, the response procedure is to monitor for potential chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats as soon as possible. Once an incident 
commander has identified the radioactivity, they may need to make mitigation decisions 
in real time while also executing other emergency operations. Because radiation expertise 
is not always readily available for the first responders, it is critical that clear and simple 
guidance is made available about what materials are required for specific mitigation 
options, how to set them up, and how to operate them. The National Incident 
Management System specifically addresses the need to resource and stockpile necessary 
supplies [7]. As IWATERS is proven to be effective, guidance can be written for incident 
commanders or local emergency operations centers to ensure proper mitigation measures 
are enacted in an expedient manner.  
Nature of the Study  
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Exposure estimations will be performed with commercial modeling code. 
Modeling also allows for multiple runs with various configurations of filter bed layout 
and radionuclide concentrations. MicroShield version 10.04 was selected for use. This 
version was chosen because it includes ICRP Publication 116 protocols for fluence to 
dose conversion coefficients and implements the ICRP 2007 recommendations [8]. The 
official ICRP phantoms, in addition to Monte Carlo simulations using five different 
modeling codes, were used to create the conversion coefficients [8]. Reference gamma 
dose conversion factors from ANSI/ANS-6.1.1-1977 are also new to version 10.04. The 
software allows for custom designed shielding material, and enables custom built source 
geometry and activity concentration.  
Assumptions and Limitations 
 
 This study focused on cesium-137 because it is highlighted in the Department of 
Homeland Security national planning scenario [9]. Even though cesium-137 presents an 
internal dose health risk via ingestion or inhalation, those routes of exposure will not be 
considered during this study. The IWATERS is a wet process that utilizes low pressure 
washing to decrease resuspension. Also, emergency responders have access to respiratory 
protection to mitigate the risk of inhaling or ingesting beta particles. In absence of 
internal dose, external dose is a function of time and dose rate. MicroShield will produce 
an estimated dose rate. The time workers spend performing the task has is based on 
recommended wash rates developed during field testing of the system. 
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Research Goals 
 
 In order to estimate the dose and provide operational guidance design, several 
research goals were established:  
● Determine the best filter bed configuration to keep exposures ALARA 
o Are there more than one acceptable alternative?  
● Determine the percent reduction of the exposure rate following 
decontamination 
● Estimate dose equivalent for early responders 
 
In addition to answering the above questions, it is the goal of this research to find 
an option that maintains exposure rates below 2 mR per hour and total estimated dose 
below 5 rem.  
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
 
The stochastic nature of long-term health effects caused by ionizing radiation 
drives the ALARA exposure guideline. ALARA principles are codified in 10 CFR Part 
20 Standards for Protection Against Radiation [10]. The US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) also requires the use of ALARA for exposure to personnel [11]. The 
principle of ALARA applies even during emergency response [12]. The exposure rates 
and dose that are considered reasonable may increase during emergencies based on the 
nature of the operation, but leaders are still obligated to protect the health of their workers 
to the greatest extent possible. The EPA Protection Action Guide for 2017 provides 
recommendations for responder total dose based on the importance of the mission. For 
mitigation operations, the goal of 5 rem was selected because it is the occupational limit. 
During the mitigation phase of the response, it is assumed that all lifesaving and critical 
infrastructure task have been completed. The EPA Protective Action Guidelines do not 
contain an exposure rate guidance level or limit. The Department of Energy, in a report 
on emergency action guidelines for RDD events, used 1 mR per hour as a notional 
exposure rate to calculate stay times within the contaminated area [13]. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission in 10 CFR 20.1301 defines the maximum allowable exposure 
rate to the public from a licensed source as 2 mR per hour [10]. The level of 2 mR per 
hour was selected because it is a well-recognized guidance value within the radiation and 
emergency response community.  
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The IWATERS Field Decontamination System is designed:  
 
“To reduce the external dose from contamination on vehicles and urban surfaces 
while simultaneously decreasing the spread of contamination and treating wash-
down water to ensure an adequate water supply for public consumption and 
continued mitigation and decontamination operations across a wide area.” [14] 
 
To date, no research has been conducted on worker exposure rates and expected 
total exposure during RDD mitigation using the IWATERS.  Following an RDD incident, 
radioactive material is spread through the urban environment on the vertical facades of 
buildings and on the horizontal surfaces of streets and sidewalks. The dispersion of the 
radioactive material dictates the starting source geometries which, in turn, affects 
radiation exposure rates. At the beginning of the decontamination process, there are 
essentially three large unshielded sources of exposure with planar geometry; the street 
and each building. During the decontamination process, each of those sources will 
effectively be converted into either point sources or line sources that are shielded using 
sand filled berms. The change in source geometry will have an effect on the exposure rate 
at a fixed distance from the source [15]. Therefore, it is possible for real-time monitoring 
to show the area at an acceptable level prior to mitigation; but then have the change in 
particle dispersion geometry significantly increase the dose rate. It is expected that the 
change from planar to point sources will increase the exposure rate at the same distance 
from the source. In order to achieve acceptable exposure levels, filter beds can be 
shielded using the same earth berms that are utilized to set up the IWATERS.  
10 
Problem Statement 
 
The IWATERS concept has been developed and tested both at the bench and pilot 
scale. The removal of the radioactive particles and transport from the surface of interest 
into the filter beds is fairly well characterized [6]. However, the dose to responders who 
are using the system and the expected external exposure rate reduction to the public from 
before decontamination to after has not been characterized. 
Key Terms 
o RDD – Radiological Dispersal Device 
o IND – Improvised Nuclear Device 
o IWATERS – Integrated Wash-Aid, Treatment, and Emergency Reuse System 
o WMD – Weapon of Mass Destruction 
Scope of Literature Review 
The foundation of this literature review was the extensive meta-analysis into 
wide-area decontamination in an urban environment published by The Nuclear 
Engineering Division at Argonne National Lab [16]. A conference hosted by Argonne 
National Lab in March, 2017, comprised more than 40 radiation professionals from the 
United States and United Kingdom with the purpose to discuss current trends in urban 
decontamination and potential future areas of research. Extensive sources were provided 
to all attendees, including this researcher. The AFIT Library provides the Ebsco 
Discovery Service for all students. The main key-words searched were: urban 
decontamination, MicroShield, urban dose modeling, and RDD decontamination 
techniques. Expert recommendations were provided by Dr. Matthew Magnuson, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Dr. Michael Kaminski, Argonne National 
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Laboratory; both are thesis committee members. All research sources were stored and 
managed using the Mendeley System.  
IWATERS 
 
 Following the 2011 reactor meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi, multiple agencies 
began research into wide area urban decontamination. In anticipation of such a need, the 
IWATERS was developed, starting in 2010, as a joint effort between the U.S. EPA, 
Department of Defense Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, and Argonne 
National Laboratory. In 2012, the IWATERS was field tested in a pilot study in Denver, 
Colorado. The pilot test showed the viability of the technology [17]. In 2015, live field 
testing was accomplished in Columbus, Ohio, and was open to local, state, and federal 
emergency responders to showcase emerging capabilities and to compile user feedback, 
i.e., the pros and cons of each system. This feedback can help to guide future research 
into operational systems [18].  
History of Nuclear Decontamination Operations 
 
Decontamination techniques for radionuclides have been extensively studied since 
the 1940s [19].  The National Homeland Security Research Center of the Office of 
Research and Development within U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has 
collaborated with the Nuclear Decontamination and Separations Branch, of the Nuclear 
Engineering Division at Argonne National Laboratory, to review existing wide-area 
radiation decontamination strategies in an urban environment and to develop new 
methods [16]. One of the identified gaps in this field is an estimate of exposure and 
effective dose in emergency responders. 
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Threat of Radioactive Material Dispersal Devices 
 
In the modern era of international terrorism, Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD) 
have captured the attention of both the American public and leaders in Congress. The 
need for federal RDD response planning was highlighted in a report to the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office in 2009 [20]. The 2006 polonium-210 incident in the 
United Kingdom demonstrated the importance of proper government planning for RDD 
incidents. Failing to establish national decontamination standards for urban RDD release 
may lead to the improper selection of decontamination techniques and the generation of 
waste that is more difficult to dispose of than the original contamination and impede 
recovery operations [21].   
 In 2011, Jonathan Medalia from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory presented 
a special brief to Congress on the threats and hazards posed by RDDs [22]. However, 
going back to 1948, radioactive material weapons were included in the original United 
Nations definition for Weapons of Mass Destruction [1], [22], [23]. The RDD differs 
from other WMDs because they are not predicted to cause high-volume casualties. The 
primary concern is economic disruption via access denial to important areas and 
psychological terror by leveraging the public’s general lack of radioactive material 
knowledge [22]. IWATERS is specifically designed to combat this issue by providing 
mitigation during the intermediate phase [12] of the emergency response to reduce dose 
and ensure that radioactive material does not adhere to surface materials [14].  
 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has produced national planning 
scenarios for the use of emergency response agencies at all levels of government to build 
realistic exercises around. Scenario 11 is for an RDD attack in a heavily populated urban 
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area [9]. The scenario provides a realistic jumping off point for contamination levels and 
incident scale. This research used the values provided in the scenario as a standard 
starting point. The planning scenario addresses decontamination in general terms and 
states it will be costly and time consuming. The methods discussed in the scenario mirror 
standard recommendations made for cleaning up nuclear contamination. These methods 
are discussed at great length in the U.K. Recovery Handbooks [24]; however, these 
Handbooks are not specifically aimed at wide area, urban RDD contamination (i.e., DHS 
planning Scenario 11). The IWATERS provides an alternative method that can be used 
during the intermediate response phase to aid decontamination, decrease waste, and allow 
access to critical facilities more quickly.  
 Dirty bomb research in Europe predicts that the plume of a dirty bomb could be 
fine, evenly-dispersed particles. These particles are capable of traveling outside the 
immediate blast area and contaminating large inhabited urban areas [25]. Dirty bombs 
present an issue for modeling because the nuclide and deposition nature are 
unpredictable. The dose contributions following an RDD may come from different 
sources than what is standard in current modeling libraries [25], [26]. Following an RDD 
detonation the radioactive material can take three forms; inert particles, soluble salts, or 
oxides. Modeling particle distribution from a blast is outside the scope of this project. 
Contamination levels based on the national planning factors were used.  
Urban Radionuclide Decontamination 
 
 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) commissioned a team of 180 
experts from 42 countries to review the entire response, decontamination, and final 
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remediation of the Fukushima Daichi incident [4]. Five technical volumes were 
produced. The fifth dealt with post-accident recovery. The report found that due to a lack 
of pre-accident preparedness, the Japanese government was forced to enact protection 
criteria, legislative basis, and guidance documents to guide workers in real-time. Multiple 
factors led to a delay in the commencement of remediation activities. First, the 
devastation of the earthquake and tsunami created extreme resource demands within the 
first year. On top of the external resource demands, the lack of preparedness meant that 
the government instituted large scale pilot testing to determine the best methods for 
decontamination. The remediation techniques focused on external exposure pathways. 
The external pathways were found to be most relevant to long-term post-accident 
population dose. The combination of these two factors meant that remediation of the 
contaminated areas did not start until after a year of data-gathering [4], [27]–[30]. The 
IAEA recommends that dose reduction techniques be based on the scale of a mediation 
efforts, site-specific factors, and resource constraints. The resource constraints and 
acceptable dose to the public drove significantly different decisions and remediation 
efforts for the Fukushima Daiichi clean-up compared with Chernobyl.  Following the 
Chernobyl disaster, cost was a significant driver of remediation techniques. Societal and 
ethical drivers played a large role in the selection of conservative decontamination 
practices in Japan, which greatly increased the cost of remediation [31]. 
The fallout from Chernobyl provided a unique environment to test and verify the 
validity of environmental radioactive material modeling. There were towns such as 
Pripyat, Ukraine, that were evacuated and left mostly uninhabited for decades after the 
accident. In Pripyat, simple decontamination measures were undertaken on living 
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quarters so that workers could be staged immediately after the accident with no other 
work done. In 2008, the Urban Remediation Working Group, a subset of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s Environmental Modeling for Radiation Safety program, set out 
to test the dose-prediction capabilities of a variety of models [3], [26], [32]. The modelers 
were provided basic guidelines for radioisotope densities and a detailed history of the 
area. For calibration purposes, they also received real-world external dose-measurement 
data. The requirement for the models was to produce external dose rates, breakdowns of 
component contributions to dose rate, radionuclide concentrations, and estimated annual 
and cumulative doses to the public. The modelers were also asked to predict the effect 
different remediation actions would have on cumulative dose. Two models found that 
washing of roofs or roads provided little reduction, while another found a 20% reduction. 
The difference between the models was in the major dose component each model 
selected [3]. Low efficacy of washing for cesium decontamination is a phenomenon 
found throughout decontamination literature; the cause of this will be discussed in the 
radiochemistry section of the literature review. The information learned from Chernobyl 
studies has enabled researchers to develop more effective decontamination strategies.  
 In an effort to stay current with ICRP recommendations and the evolving threat of 
global terrorism, experts from across Europe have updated the European Decision 
handbook for radioactive emergency response (EURANOS). The handbook includes 59 
countermeasures and guidance for when and how to employ them. The guidance is 
supported by modeling efforts using ARGOS and RODOS code [25]. It is noted that 
following Chernobyl, a lack of understanding of the behavior and deposition of 
radioactive particles in the urban inhabited environment led to arguably poor 
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decontamination decisions. This point is highlighted by showing the expected percent 
remaining of cesium on roofs against the actual value measured. There is an 
approximately 25% difference between simple extrapolation and the measured data 
points at 15 years. The most common cesium found in radioactive material is soluble and 
causes the  cesium to adhere strongly to common porous construction material [25]. 
Radiochemistry 
 
 The difficulty of cesium decontamination has been studied and verified since 
before the Chernobyl disaster. Even though the studies used a limit sample size, Warming 
showed that once radio-cesium becomes wet the standard decontamination techniques no 
longer reduced external exposure [33], [34]. Argonne National Laboratory has conducted 
bench-scale testing to quantify the difference in removal efficiency between tap water 
and various ionic solutions and the difference between wet and dry cesium. The results 
show that washing mobile radioactive particles, such as Cs-137, with a 0.5 M KCl 
solution improves the removal for Cs-137, Sr-90, and Eu-152 across brick, concrete and 
asphalt [35].  Research conducted by the Argonne National Laboratory found that 
multiple washings does not significantly improve cesium removal [6]. The data matches 
results found by researchers studying urban decontamination following the Chernobyl 
disaster [26]. It clearly demonstrates that if cesium is applied in solution or becomes wet, 
it becomes very difficult to remove. Using an ammonium chloride rinse, wet cesium was 
removed with 20% efficiency, while dry cesium was removed at nearly 80%. For 
removal from asphalt, the findings were more extreme; wet cesium was removed at lower 
than 20%, dry cesium achieved over 90%. Based on the findings in this study that dry 
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cesium can be removed with at least 80% efficiency but that wet cesium proves much 
more difficult, the exposure rate calculations will be performed using removal 
efficiencies of 80, 50 and 30%. A new source for the material left on the buildings will be 
created so that a percent exposure reduction can be found.  
 In 2000, French researchers used the ASTRAL and ABRICOT modeling codes to 
evaluate different remediation techniques in three zones following a BORAX-type 
accident in a nuclear reactor. The study looked at Cs-137, Cs-134, and I-131. The 
population was broken up into different milieu: adult farm worker, adult in urban private 
house, child in urban private house, infant, and adult in urban apartment block. The urban 
adult apartment block scenario most closely resembled the IWATERS scenario of this 
study [36]. In the French study, the urban milieu was broken up into compartments of 
roads/pavements, façades, roofs, soil in parks, and trees and bushes. The study-selected 
washings as the countermeasure for the first three with roof replacement also an option. 
The soil could be stripped and the trees and bushes pruned. Each of the countermeasures 
was evaluated for effect on external dose at the end of the first year if enacted 
individually or in combination with the others. (IWATERS deals specifically with 
washing the outside of the façade [36].) The results confirm the difficult nature of cesium 
contamination. Earlier washing provided better dose reduction than delayed washing. 
However, immediate washing followed by successive washing during the first month 
only marginally improved the dose reduction.  
The findings of Kaminski et al. [6] are in agreement with this study and point out 
that after the first wash the cesium behaves effectively as if it was applied with a wet 
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technique. To achieve the best dose reduction, it is imperative that washing occur as soon 
as possible and ideally before a rain event.  
Site Selection 
 The financial district of Chicago was selected as the modeling site. The most 
appropriate decontamination technique for use in a given scenario is driven by the 
radionuclide of interest, the building material, the location, and structure of buildings 
[25], [32]. The desired location traits were brick or concrete building façades because 
they are the most susceptible to radiocesium binding [6]. In addition, the area needed to 
be an urban canyon similar to the site used in the National Planning Scenario so that the 
deposition concentrations could be used. The urban canyon also allows the modelled 
source pre-decontamination to be infinite plane sources with all contamination on the 
surface. An area with historic or important architecture was also desired because 
IWATERS is non-abrasive, and one of the benefits of the system is that it does not 
destroy the building material. 
Research from the Sandia National Laboratory studied the effect of rain storms on 
contaminated asphalt surfaces. The study found that asphalt will hold up to 3 mm of rain; 
therefore, no radioactive material runoff is expected until at least 3 mm of rain has fallen 
[37]. It should be noted that this value may vary depending on the age and condition of 
the asphalt and any prior contaminates. The level of water that a material will hold will 
also vary passed on the type of material, so concrete or brick will be different than 
asphalt. The important thing to note is that there is some low level of moisture that the 
porous material will hold before runoff starts. The intensity and frequency of rain will 
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vary by location. Warming cites that there is only a 3% probability of intense rain in the 
country of Denmark [33]. However, an analysis of the average number of days with rain 
per month and the average number of inches of rain per month in Chicago finds that the 
lowest average number of millimeters expected per rain event is 4 [38]. This means that 
any rain event occurring in the Chicago area post contamination, on average, will lead to 
radioactive material runoff if mitigation is not accomplished promptly. 
Barrier Structure and Fill Material   
 The IWATERS can be set up and used with any non-permeable barrier that is 
capable of withstanding the combined force of the fill material and wash solution.  
HESCO is a private company that specializes in rapidly deployable barriers. Their 
products were selected for use in IWATERS design and testing for three principle 
reasons: ease of use, modularity, and current world-wide availability [17].  
 The fill material for both the filter beds and earth berms may vary significantly. 
The type of sand that is available at any given location will have a unique composition 
and density. The buildup factor is used to correct for underestimation of exposure at the 
point of the receiver due to scattering as the radiation is traveling through material [13]. 
The buildup factor will change based on the density of the material used for the filter 
beds and berm fill material, furthering underscoring the role of dose characterization and 
modelling during all decontamination operations. The density values used for this 
experiment are explained in the methodology section.    
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MicroShield 
 
 The MicroShield software program has been recognized as an appropriate and 
useful tool to model worker dose for more than 25 years [39]. The Department of Energy 
study led by Travis laid out basic criteria for estimating dose: the identity and 
concentration of the radionuclide, the distance to and duration of worker exposure, and 
the type of shielding available. MicroShield is able to account for each of those 
parameters. The user is also able to build custom source material and shield composition. 
Travis identified myriad tasks and workers involved with nuclear site decontamination 
and decommissioning; of these the most appropriate proxy for urban RDD mitigation is 
the building decontamination workers. The methodology used in the Travis study for the 
building decontamination workers helped to inform the modeling methodology for this 
research.   
 A few significant differences exist between the DOE work and RDD mitigation.  
For instance, DOE sites are by and large restricted access sites with no public exposure 
and do not have a firm timeline for reopening. Following an RDD event in a city area, 
there will be a need to quickly reopen assets, which makes IWATERS preferable to many 
of the decontamination techniques used in the DOE study [39]. Also, the DOE sites are 
performed by radiation-trained workers. In the event of rapid, wide-area 
decontamination, there may not be time to wait for specially-trained workers; therefore, 
local emergency responders with just-in-time training may be required. This necessitates 
a review of the exposure time frame, and it may be longer for workers not used to 
performing the operation. 
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 The IWATERS system consists of a two-part filtration system. The radioactive 
material is washed off of the side of the building or vehicle and routed through a series of 
vermiculite filter beds. The radioactive particles adhere to the filter material, and then the 
water is passed through a particle removal unit to ensure that the reused water is free of 
radionuclides [14]. This process concentrates the contamination from a large surface area 
planar source into a de facto point source or line source. One of the reasons that 
MicroShield was selected for this research is its ability to create a source made of 
customizable material, geometry, and activity concentration. The code accounts for build-
up and self-shielding of the source. Research into the external dose presented by 
concentrated sludge as a result of uranium mining showed that the MicroShield code was 
in agreement with field measurements [40].  
 Numerous radiation dose-modeling software programs exist for emergency 
responders. Each one operates on different assumptions and requires a different level of 
user knowledge to produce results. MicroShield is a platform that is kept up-to-date with 
recommendations from the ICRP [8]. A review of software that is available to emergency 
responders found that MicroShield is useful for “determining doses from a number of 
fixed geometries, source configurations and shielding materials." [41]. For their analysis 
Waller et. al broke end-users into seven categories: First-on-the-scene, CBRNe 
responders, Incident Commanders, Health Physics Reach-back, Hospital Emergency 
Services, Radiation Biodosimetry, and Forensic Criminal Investigation. They then 
defined the software application categories as: medical triage, medical treatment, hazard 
prediction, dosimetry, and training. There is a review of 11 software codes, all of which 
fall short for this research because they do not also contain shielding code. MicroShield is 
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included in the section for shielding code. The research states that shielding code is most 
applicable for RDD events involving a gamma exposure. Four shielding codes are 
reviewed: MicroShield, MCNP, MCNPX, and GEANT). The last three require expert 
users and perform three-dimensional Monte Carlo analysis. It is noted that the point 
kernel analysis of MicroShield is more user friendly and includes are required properties 
for RDD scenarios.  
 Before an environmental site can be officially declared clean or safe for use, the 
governing agency generally demonstrate adherence with a dose or risk-based standards. 
The Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual provides detailed 
guidance on how to show all requirements have been met—including the use of 
modelling [42]. MicroShield is one of the accepted technologies that have been used to 
estimate external dose from low level environmental exposures [43]. Chapter 6 in the 
book “Environmental Remediation and Restoration of Contaminated Nuclear and NORM 
Sites” details modelling of contaminated sites. The author reviewed 19 different 
modeling software and broke them up into three tiers based on the complexity and 
sophistication of the model [44]. MicroShield is placed in the third tier as being 
appropriate for the most detailed work. The other tier 3 codes reviewed were CHAIN, 
CHAIN 2D, PC-CREAM, SATURN, MILDOS AREA, MULTIMED DP. MicroShield 
was the only code that included shielding analysis as a core function. 
 In 2009, Sandia National Lab performed a modeling exercise to determine the 
dose to first responders following a loss of lead shielding during transportation of a spent 
nuclear fuel cask. In the event of a vehicle crash, the lead shielding for the cask may 
deform or, if a fire is involved, melt and flow away. Ten different shield-loss scenarios 
23 
were run. These are reasonable approximations of RDD events because of the 
asymmetrical nature and potential to occur in urban areas. MicroShield was used by the 
researchers to model the effects of the different level of shielding on responder dose. 
[45].   
Conclusion 
 
The asymmetrical nature of RDD events makes planning difficult. One of the 
fundamental issues with RDDs is that even with low casualty numbers they may still 
deny access to important assets. Immediate time-scale mitigation efforts may serve to 
reduce cost, contaminated waste generation, and down time. Cs-137 is a common isotope 
with potential for use in an RDD. The radiochemistry of cesium makes it mobile and 
adhere to porous construction materials. IWATERS uses an ion exchange wash to 
quickly and efficiently remove the contamination before it has a chance to adsorb to the 
building material. An estimate of dose for the responders may facilitate widespread 
implementation of the system.  
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III.  Methodology 
 
In order to meet the research objectives, the modeling was broken down into three 
phases. The first was to determine the pre-decontamination conditions. This included: 
finding total activity, the amount of filter material required, the exposure rate prior to 
decontamination, and the acceptability of different filter bed options and locations.  
The second phase dealt with the exposure rates throughout the process of 
decontamination. This meant: finding the activity concentrations for 80%, 50%, and 30% 
wash efficiency, determining the main source of exposure, and the exposure rate for each 
phase of the decontamination.  
The final phase was the expected total exposure to emergency crews. In order to 
convert exposure rate to exposure, the estimated time and shift breakdown was required.  
Site Selection 
 
 46 N. Canal Street was selected as the location of the decontamination. 
The buildings at this location form an urban canyon which can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. 
The images shown of the area were taken from Google Maps on 8 January 2018. It 
should be noted that while the buildings are this location do contain porous building 
material there are also other materials such as glass that are easier to remove radioactive 
material from. This may improve the overall removal efficiency in a real-world scenario.  
Figures 3 and 4 show the dimensions of the city block and form the foundation for the 
area source sizes used through the research. The range of distances for the length were 
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between 394 and 402 feet based on 10 measurements. The range of width was between 
88 and 91 feet based on 10 measurements. For ease, the assumed length and width of the 
street were set at 400 feet and 90 feet, respectively.  
  
 
Figure 2: 46 N. Canal Street 
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Figure 3: Street View 46 N. Canal Street 
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Figure 4: Length Measurement of Modeling Site 
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Figure 5: Width Measurement of Modeling Site 
 
MicroShield Inputs 
 The MicroShield software allows for significant user input. Each input required 
an initial assumption with results driving further analysis.  
Source strength.   
 
The 2006 National Planning Scenario 11 provided the realistic basis for the total 
Cs-137 involved in the incident. The total activity is 2,300 Curies. The modeling used in 
the planning scenario predicts that, “Radioactivity concentrations in this zone are on the 
order of 5 to 50 microcuries per meter squared, with hot spots measuring 100 to 500 
microcuries per meter squared” [9]. The scenario does not provide a geometric mean or 
geometric standard deviation of the concentrations; this means that a distribution profile 
cannot be generated. It is known that most natural distributions are adequately described 
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by the lognormal profile [46], [47]. For all calculations, a concentration of 50 microcuries 
per meter squared was used.  
Source geometry 
 The side of the buildings and the street were represented as vertical and horizontal 
rectangular area sources in relation to a person standing on the street. Figures 6 and 7 
show the modeled plane sources with exposure points down the middle of the street. The 
units in the embedded table are in feet and depict the coordinates of individual dose 
points from the origin of the source. The point source approximation for a radiation 
source is only valid if the receiver is more than three times the longest dimension from 
the source [15]. This is not the case when the activity is spread out over the surface of the 
buildings or street. Once the Cs-137 particles are washed into the filtration basins, the 
activity density will increase and the point source approximation becomes more valid. A 
limitation of MicroShield is that the dose point must be outside of the source. If the street 
is modeled as a single rectangular plane, with the dose point hovering over the top of the 
source the software returns as error message and will not compile. To account for the 
exposure from the street, the source was broken into two 44 foot by 100 foot sources and 
then added together.  
Two geometries were considered for the filter beds. The first is a rectangular volume 
source the size of a single Jackbox HESCO cell, 27 cubic feet (3’ x 3’ x 3’) [48]–[50]. 
The second was a line source along the building. The line source was considered for 
operational reasons. It can be set up along the edge of the building and reduce the number 
of times the water has to be moved. The wash water falls directly into the line filter bed 
and then is pumped straight into the ion exchange system. As opposed to having the wash 
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water fall into a trough then be pumped to the filter bed and then pumped a second time 
to the ion exchange system. In addition, the line source is predicted to lower exposure 
rates because it spreads the activity over a larger volume, decreasing the activity 
concentration at any single point. Figures 8-10 depict the line and point sources with 
shielding as modeled in MircoShield. The units in the embedded table for these figures 
are in feet and depict the coordinates of each dose point from the origin of the source.  
 
Figure 6: Horizontal Plane Source  
 
31 
 
Figure 7: Vertical Plane Source 
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Figure 8: Line Source in Front of Building 1 with Shielding Coordinates in Feet 
 
Figure 9: End View of Line Source 
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Figure 10: End View of Point Source 
 
 Source composition 
 The filter beds are filled with a vermiculite and clay mixture. As the radiocesium 
ions adhere to the adsorption sites, they will change the molecular composition of the 
source. MicroShield always assumes a homogeneous distribution of the activity within 
the source. In environmental transport modeling, there are two common models used for 
mass balance systems; plug flow reactors and continuously stirred tank reactors (CSTR) 
[51]. The IWATERS geometry more closely resembles a plug flow reactor with 
contaminant coming in the top and slowly working its way down the column. However, 
due to the homogeneous limitation of MicroShield, the source is modeled as if it is a 
CSTR with instantaneous and complete mixing. This means that to meet the restraints of 
the modeling code, the filter bed can only be modeled at the completion of a mitigation 
phase. Using sensitivity analysis, the software will allow for increasing or decreasing 
source strength over time; but each time the activity level is changed, the particles are 
modelled as being uniformly distributed throughout the volume of the source.  
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MicroShield has the capability to custom build the source material to match the 
exact density of the source. It is able to account not only for the vermiculite, sand, and 
water molecules, but also for the Cs-137 molecules. It was decided not to use this option 
because it did not add to the achievement of the research. The objective is to establish 
initial feasibility and to compare different techniques. During the course of this research, 
Grove Inc. released a new MircoShield version along with six new custom build material 
files with buildup factors that have been tested and verified by the company. These files 
included two different sands and a clay. The sand used is Florida Fine Sand with a 
density range of 1.70-2.30 grams per cubic centimeter. The default density of 2.0 was 
used for all shield material because the sand density in any given situation is unknown. 
The clay is Kansas Summit Clay with a density range of 1.64 to 2.6 grams per cubic 
centimeter. During the Denver pilot study of IWATERS, it was noted that the VCX 
vermiculite used has a particularly low density [17]. The filter material for this modeling 
exercise was a 70:30 sand to clay ratio. The given density of the VCX vermiculite is a 
range of 0.640-1.041 grams per cubic centimeter [52]; a default of 0.67 was selected.  
The formula below shows the combination of the sand and clay densities in a ratio of 
70:30 to yield a density of 1.6 grams per cubic centimeter. This value was used as the 
source density for all models.  
0.3 ∗ 0.67 / 	 0.7 ∗ 2 / 	 	1.6	 /  
 
Filter bed volume 
The first step in determining the filter bed volume was to determine the maximum 
activity load of the source material. Soluble radioactive transport modeling was 
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performed by the Argonne National Laboratory using the GoldSim software[53]. Table 1 
shows the volume of filter material required to hold 100, 500, and 1000 Curies of activity 
before breakthrough; defined as effluent from the filter bed with a concentration of more 
than 10 percent the activity concentration as the incoming wash water. The standard bed 
volume activity loads were calculated using the 70:30 sand to clay ratio, tap water, and a 
water concentration of 15 millicuries per liter.  
Table 1: Standard Bed Volume Activity Loads 
Height (cm) Radius (cm) Area 
(cm2) 
Volume 
(cm3) 
Max Cs-137 
(Ci) 
19.6 1,380 5.95 x 106 1.67 x 108 100 
64.2 1,380 5.95 x 106 3.82 x 108 500 
111.0 1,380 5.95 x 106 6.61 x 108 1000 
 
The total amount of activity required to be decontaminated was found by multiplying 
the surface area of each building in the street by the concentration of 50 microcuries per 
meter squared. The concentration is the high end of the expected concentrations from the 
National Planning Scenario number 11 [9]. The total activity to be decontaminated is 
0.5388 Ci. There is 0.186 Ci on each building and 0.167 Ci on the street. For the purpose 
of calculating the surface area of the sources the length of the buildings and street are 
both 400 feet. The building height was set at 100 feet, as explained in the height of 
building decontamination section on page 40. The width of the street is set at 90 feet 
based on measurements taken using Google Maps, these are shown in the Location 
section of the methodology.  
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400	 ∗ 100	 	40,000	  
40,000	 ∗ 	0.093	 / 	 	3,716	  
	3,716	 ∗ 	50 0.186	 : for	2	buildings	0.186 ∗ 2	 0.372	Ci 
400	 ∗ 90	 	36,000	  
36,000	 	∗ 0.093	 / 	 	3,345	  
	3,345	 ∗ 	50	 / 	 0.167	  
In order to scale down the size of the filter beds from the standard bed volume, the 
height was kept the same while the surface area footprint was reduced at the ratio 
required to hold the amount of curies necessary. The height must be kept the same 
because the GoldSim model assumes there is a head of water sitting on top of the bed that 
produces the downward flow rate due to gravity. The model predicted bed volume for 
activity load before breakthrough not just total activity load because of this the height 
must be maintained and only the footprint area scaled. For example, 500 Ci are held in a 
bed with a height of 64.2 cm and foot print area of 5.95 x 106 cm2. The total curie 
required for the block is roughly 1000 times less than the 500 Ci standard. The footprint 
can therefore be reduced by a factor of 1000 to 5,950 cm2. In order to hold the required 
activity the filter bed needs to be at least 65 cm in height with a foot print area of 5,950 
cm2. For a circular filter bed this means a bed with a radius of approximately 44 cm. 
These constraints led to the selection of four filter beds for testing. Table 2 shows the 
activity load of the filter bed options. The four options explored were a standard 55-
gallon drum and three different HESCO barrier products. The base unit for each HESCO 
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product is a wired cage that can be filled with a liner and then barrier material. The 
dimensions of the base units for all are approximately 27 cubic feet. The difference 
between the products are in how many base units form a single deployable unit. The 
Jackbox is the most modular and can be deployed in any combination of singular base 
units. The Floodline recoverable comes in deployable units of 5. The CART is the fastest 
to set up, it can be deployed from a sled behind a moving vehicle to lay 280 linear feet of 
barrier is under a minute. The CART is also the least modular [48]–[50]. It was found 
that at least three 55-gallon drum volumes are required to hold the necessary activity. 
However, any of the three HESCO products will hold enough activity to decontaminate 
the entire site. 
To obtain realistic drum thickness values the Uline-10758 drum was used as the 
model. The top, bottom, and side thickness of the drum are all 1 mm [54]. The 
dimensions for the HESCO barriers are all pulled from the latest HESCO product catalog 
[48]–[50]. 
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Table 2: Filter Bed Activity Capacities 
55 Gallon (200 L) Drum Notes 
Height 
(cm) all 
filled to 
64.2 
Radius 
(cm) 
Area 
(cm^2) 
Volume 
(cm^3) 
Max Cs-137 
(Ci) 
  
88.1 28.6 2,570 2.27 x 105 0.216  
HESCO Options   
Height 
(cm) all 
filled to 
64.17 
Radius 
(cm) 
Area 
(cm^2) 
Volume 
(cm^3) 
Max Cs-137 
(Ci) 
  
100 N/A 1.17 x 106 1.17 x 106 0.980 CART(SL3942) 
100 N/A 9,150 9.15 x 105 0.769 Jackbox (3939) 
91 N/A 8,320 7.57 x 105 0.699 Floodline (3636) 
Recoverable  
  
 
Shielding material 
  
 MicroShield enables the user to build custom shielding material based on the 
molecular composition of the shield. It will also assign buildup factors to custom 
materials based on the composition. The software also comes preloaded with a variety of 
shielding materials that have been verified by the manufacturer. For this research, the 
initial runs contained no shielding material. There will be negligible shielding of high 
energy gamma-rays while the radionuclides are on the building. The filter beds were 
tested both without shielding and with shielding for exposure rate at 1 m. The shielding 
consisted of 1 row of HESCO barriers filled with sand at an assumed density of 2 grams 
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per cubic centimeter. The 55 gallon drums also included the steel walls (1mm) as 
shielding.  
Exposure Locations 
 
 The MicroShield software allows for the simultaneous calculation of six dose 
points on each run. For the pre-decontamination and post-decontamination comparison, 
the dose points are six evenly spaced locations down the centerline of the street. Prior to 
decontamination there are three modeled sources for each of the six points. Figure 11 
shows a conceptual model of the modeled exposure points and each of the area sources. 
For all future references building one is grey in color and building two is brown. Figure 
11 is to scale. The length of the street and buildings is 400 feet. Each building is 100 feet 
tall and the street is 90 feet wide.  
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Figure 11: Conceptual Model of Worker Exposure Points 
 
Individual Run Variables 
Height of Building Decontamination 
There are practical restrictions on how high emergency responders are able to 
decontaminate a building. It is important to have clear guidance on how high up the 
building responders need to decontaminate to achieve successful mitigation. MicroShield 
has the built-in capability to vary one user-defined input. By running the exposure 
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calculation in predefined vertical segments, the percent each vertical segment contributes 
to the overall exposure rate at each of the six exposure locations was determined. Each 
vertical segment was defined as 10 feet because this is the standard height of an 
American building floor. The sensitivity analysis of the vertical area sources found that 
90 percent of the exposure rate at ground level comes from the activity in the first nine 
stories of the building. The vertical height of the source was set at 100 ft or 10 stories. 
The Chicago Fire Department has multiple ladder companies within the vicinity of 46 N. 
Canal Street. The closest is Company 3, and their ladder trucks are capable of reaching 
the required height [55]. 
Number of Filter Beds 
 
 The number of filter beds required will be based on the dose rate to workers when 
the bed is at Cs-137 saturation. It is desired to keep total exposure rate below 2 mR/hour. 
During contingency response, federal guidance allows workers to be exposed to rates 
higher, but the goal is to engineer the system to keep exposure ALARA. The four filter 
beds were tested without shielding. Table 3 shows that all four options are over the 
desired dose rate at 1 meter. The 55-gallon drum is the tallest with the three HESCO 
options virtually the same. The options were tested again utilizing the shielding described 
in the shielding material section above. Table 4 shows that with shielding all four options 
have an acceptably low exposure rate for use.  In the final analysis, the 55-gallon drum 
was dropped from consideration because it clearly has the highest exposure rate, does not 
hold as much radioactive material, and is made of steel. Cesium-137 decays via beta 
emission to form Ba-137m [56]. The half-life of BA-137m is approximately two and a 
half minutes and decays with the emission of a 661.7 kiloelectron volt gamma [57]. The 
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MicroShield software is not capable of modeling beta interactions with high Z materials 
(like steel) that produce Bremsstrahlung x-rays. Through self-shielding the filter bed 
material will block most of the beta particles from interacting with the steel walls and 
only the particles on the outer most edge of the filter material will interact to create 
Bremsstrahlung x-rays. Even though the production of Bremsstrahlung x-rays is 
predicted to be a minor addition to the overall exposure rate, the 55-gallon drum is 
already the filter bed with the highest exposure rate so any addition to the exposure rate 
widens the exposure rate gap between the drum and the other options. Due to these draw 
backs, it is not recommended at this time to use a 55-gallon drum, especially a steel one.  
Table 3: Exposure Rates Without Shielding at 1 meter for Different Filter Bed 
Options 
Filter Bed 1m Exposure Rate w/buildup (mR/hr) 
55 gal Drum 7.0 
Floodline 4.3 
CART 4.3 
Jackbox 4.2 
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Table 4: Exposure Rates at 1 meter for Filter Bed Options with 1 m3 Sand Shielding 
Filter Bed 1m Exposure Rate w/buildup (mR/hr) 
55 gal Drum 6.1 x 10-5 
HESCO  2.2 x 10-5 
 
Location of Filter Beds 
 
 If the first stage of decontamination operations is to remove contamination from 
the street, worker exposure can be reduced. Based on modeling and real-world sampling 
from Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi, it is expected that the horizontal surfaces will 
contribute the most to personal dose[25], [30], [32]; it is also desired to have the shortest 
linear feet required for particle washing. This helps to ensure that particles are not 
resuspended during long wash times. Three filter bed locations were tested for this phase. 
The first option was to have the filter bed at the end of the street and wash all particles 
toward that location.  The second option was to have a filter bed in the middle of the 
street and then wash contamination towards the filter bed from each side. The final 
configuration was to have the filter set-up as a long line along the front of building one 
and wash all contamination across the street toward the building.  
 
Receiver Exposure Time 
 
 The external dose to the workers is a function of exposure rate and time. The time 
required to decontaminate depends on the size and type of building. An estimate of time 
to use the system was established by pilot-scale testing. The range of wash rates selected 
came from the IWATERS technical guidance published by the U.S. EPA. It is 
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recommended that washing occurs between 40 and 80 square meters per hour [14]. These 
wash rates were used to determine the total amount of time required for the operation and 
the total number of crew shifts required. The decontamination time was found by 
multiplying the wash rate by the total combine surface area of both buildings and the 
street.  
Table 5 shows the time requirements using three different flow rates. To meet the 
principle of ALARA it was decided that working shifts would last 8 hours.  
Table 5: Time Require to Perform Decontamination Based on Wash Rate 
Wash rate m2/hr Decontamination 
Time 
Number 8 hour 
shifts  
40 60 80 92.9 61.9 46.5 12.0 8.0 6.0 
Wash rate m2/hr Decontamination 
Time 
 Number 8 hour 
shifts 
40 60 80 83.6 55.7 41.8 11.0 7.0 6.0 
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Exposure Rate Modeling 
 
 The list below outlines the steps used to generate all model trials for this research. 
MicroShield exports all data into Microsoft Excel format. The trial data can be found in 
Appendix A. The trial parameters found in Appendix A combined with the steps below 
will recreate all model trials. Figure 6 provides an example of the data that is exported 
from MicroShield.  The key input parameters to recreate a modeling event are all shown 
in their own box at the top of the MicroShield export. The following steps were used to 
generate all model trials:   
1. Open MicroShield version 10.04. 
2. Select new.  
3. Select source geometry from 16 menu options. 
4. A new screen opens.  The default units are centimeters. The units were 
changed to feet. 
5. Enter length of the source. 
6. Enter width of the source. 
7. Enter the thickness of up to 10 shields. 
8. Enter the XYZ coordinates of up to 6 dose points. 
9. Select materials tab. 
10. Select custom material button. Add sand and clay. 
11. Enter the density of each material. 
12. Select source tab. 
13. Select nuclides button. Choose Cs-137 click okay. 
14. Center the total activity or the activity concentration. 
15. Select group photons. Click yes to include Ba-137m daughter products and 
yes to use 5 groupings. 
16. Select buildup tab to ensure values have populated. 
17. Select integration tab. Leave default settings of 20. 
18. Select title tab to label the trial. 
19. Selected sensitivity tab to perform single variable sensitivity analysis, if 
desired. 
20. Click on the red run case button. If button is not red there has been an error in 
data entry. 
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Figure 12: Example of MicroShield Input Data 
 
 
 Following the completion of a modeling run MicroShield exports the data as a 
formatted text file. The user has the option to save the file as a Microsoft Excel 
document. Figure 12 is the top half of the modeling results file. It contains all of the 
relevant data that was input to generate the model. All model runs are exported in the 
same format. The first nine lines contain descriptive information about the modeler, date, 
and titles. In this example, starting with line 10, there is the source geometry (rectangular 
area – vertical). Working down the image are the source dimensions, coordinates of all 
dose points, all shields with their thickness and density, the radio nuclides with activity 
and concentration, and finally the buildup and integration parameters. 
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Estimate of Dose Equivalent  
 The EPA protective action guides and the NRC limits are given in 
millirem. Rem is the traditional unit for dose equivalent that enables comparison of 
biological effects across radiation types through the use of a quality factor. The quality 
factor helps to equate health risk (dose equivalent) with absorbed dose in tissue. 
MicroShield does not calculate the dose equivalent nor the absorbed dose in tissue. The 
absorbed dose value that is produced from MicroShield is for air [8]. Exposure has units 
of coulombs per kilogram of air and is a measure of the ability of photons to produce 
charge in a set mass of air and does not account for the amount of energy absorbed by the 
material nor the ionization potential of the radiation. F-Factors are derived values that 
enable conversion from exposure to absorbed dose. The f-factor for water is 0.96 and can 
be used as a reasonable facsimile for soft tissue [58]. For the purpose of this research the 
f-factor was rounded up to 1. The quality factor for gamma rays is also one [13]. This 
means for the purpose of this research equivalent dose from external gamma radiation 
will be assumed to be the same as the exposure.  
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IV. Results and Discussion 
The results of the modeling trials are presented below. The results are organized 
by decontamination phase.  
Pre-Decontamination  
Before modeling was accomplished, the total area, total activity, wash rate, 
decontamination time, and required number of shifts, were calculated. The activities 
remaining on the wall and transitioning into the filter bed after each shift based on a 
steady work rate are shown below in Tables 6 and 7. Each table contains the activity 
partition between the original source and filter bed for 80%, 50%, and 30% removal 
efficiency.  The final activity breakdown was used to calculate the source strength of the 
buildings and streets post decontamination in the exposure models.  The 80%, 50%, and 
30% removal efficiencies were not utilized for the street decontamination. For the sake of 
the of this study, we simplify our scenario by assuming 100% of the horizontal 
contamination is removed.  All street activity is contained within the filter bed. 
Table 6: Activity Partition on Building 1 Following Decontamination with Removal 
Percentages of 80, 50, and 30 Percent 
Percent 
Removal 
Activity on 
Building 1 (Ci) 
Activity in 
Filter Bed (Ci) 
80% 0.037 0.149 
50% 0.093 0.093 
30% 0.130 0.056 
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Table 7: Activity Partition on Building 1 Following Decontamination with Removal 
Percentages of 80, 50, and 30 Percent 
Percent 
Removal 
Activity on 
Building 2 (Ci) 
Activity in 
Filter Bed (Ci) 
80% 0.037 0.149 
50% 0.093 
 
0.093 
30% 0.130 0.056 
 
Table 8 shows the exposure rates in milliroentgens per hour at six points down the 
center line of the street prior to any mitigation operations. Figure 11 illustrates the pre-
decontamination conditions with all three surfaces covered with contamination at a 
concentration of 50 microcuries per meter squared. The range of exposure rates is 
between 0.25 and 0.62 milliroentgens per hour.  As noted in the literature review, it is 
desired to maintain exposure rates below two milliroentgens per hour. The exposure rates 
prior to decontamination might not prohibit non-radiation workers from being trained in 
the operation of IWATERS and being able to implement mitigation techniques.   
 Even though the total surface area of the horizontal sources makes up less than a 
third of the total contaminated surface area, it is the single largest contributor to the 
overall exposure rate. At each point, the total exposure rate from the street is roughly four 
times greater than the exposure contribution from the vertical surfaces. Using point one 
as an example, the total rate from the street is 0.5 milliroentgen per hour and from the 
two buildings it is 0.12 milliroentgen per hour. At point one the street exposure rate is 
4.17 times greater than the combined building exposure rate. This finding is consistent 
with research from Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi. It was expected that the horizontal 
area source would have the most significant impact on exposure.  
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Table 8: Pre-Decontamination Exposure Rates at Street Centerline (mR/hr) 
Point Street 1 Street 2 Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total 
1 0.25 0.25 0.06 0.06 0.62 
2 0.26 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.65 
3 0.27 0.27 0.06 0.06 0.66 
4 0.26 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.65 
5 0.25 0.25 0.06 0.06 0.62 
6 0.14 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.34 
 
Street Decontamination  
  Based on preliminary modeling of filter bed activity concentration, three filter 
bed options were selected for further analysis.  Table 9 shows the results of 100% 
removal of all street activity into a single HESCO berm located at the end of the block. 
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The filter bed was shielded by a single layer of Jackbox HESCO berms. Figure 13 shows 
the filter bed in light blue with HESCO berms surrounding it.  
 
Figure 13: Filter Bed at the end of the Street with HESCO Berm Shielding 
 
The exposure rate contribution from the activity originally on the street following 
decontamination drops to negligible values between the ranges of 4.4 x 10-5 and 1.1 x 10-8 
milliroentgen per hour.  The single act of decontaminating the street produces a reduction 
in exposure rate between 79% and 82%.  
There is minimal difference between the three filter bed placement options. Each 
of the three options are within 0.1%  of each other across all six exposure points. 
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Depending on the amount of available berm material, access points into the mitigation 
area, location of fire hydrants, or any other variable unique to a particular response, the 
incident commander can choose any of the three set-ups; single HESCO filter bed at the 
end of the street, single HESCO filter bed in the middle of the street or a line source 
along the front of building one and expect similar amounts of exposure. Figures 14 and 
15 show the center of the street and line source configurations, respectively. It should be 
noted that in tables 9-11 the exposure rates from each building are contained and they 
match each other.  This is because they are identical in area and contamination 
concentration and the six exposure points are the same distance from all points on each of 
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the two sources. As the phases of the decontamination progress the exposure rate 
contribution from the different sources will change.  
 
Figure 14: Single HESCO Filter Bed with HESCO Berm Shielding in the Center of 
the Street 
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Figure 15: HESCO Line Source with HESCO Berm Shielding along the Front of 
Building 1 
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Table 9: Exposure Rates Post-Street Decontamination with Single HESCO Filter 
Bed Located at the End of the Block. (mR/hr) 
Point Street Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 4.4 x 10-5 0.06 0.06 0.11 81.87% 
2 4.5 x 10-7 0.06 0.06 0.13 80.80% 
3 1.0 x 10-7 0.06 0.06 0.13 80.55% 
4 3.9 x 10-8 0.06 0.06 0.13 80.80% 
5 1.8 x 10-8 0.06 0.06 0.11 81.88% 
6 1.0 x 10-8 0.04 0.04 0.07 79.25% 
 
Table 10 shows the results of the street decontamination with the same single 
HESCO filter bed shielded by one layer of HESCO Jackbox berms placed in the center of 
the street. The average exposure rate contribution from the middle of the street 
configuration has two dose points (3 and 4) on the scale of 10-5 and then rates dropping 
down into the range of times 10-7. This is slightly higher than the end of street option that 
has only point 1 at  10-5  and then steadily decreases into the range of times 10-8 
However, the exposure rate contribution from the street after the activity in in the filter 
bed is still at a low enough level that it does not change the exposure rate at two 
significant figures The percent reduction in overall exposure rate is virtually the same 
when utilizing either street decontamination filter bed placement. 
Table 10: Exposure Rates Post-Street Decontamination with a Single HESCO Filter 
Bed Located at the Center of the Street. (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.0 x 10-7 0.06 0.06 0.11 81.88% 
2 4.4 x 10-7 0.06 0.06 0.13 80.80% 
3 4.3 x 10-5 0.06 0.06 0.13 80.55% 
4 4.3 x 10-5 0.06 0.06 0.13 80.80% 
5 4.4 x 10-7 0.06 0.06 0.11 81.88% 
6 1.0 x 10-7 0.04 0.04 0.07 79.25% 
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Table 11 shows the results of the final filter bed option for use in decontaminating 
the street. The filter material is placed in a line along the front of building 1. This allows 
the decontamination crew to wash radioactive material only 90 linear feet as opposed to 
400 or 200 linear feet in the first two options.  The linear filter bed also has the advantage 
of spreading out the concentration of radioactive material over a longer surface area. This 
means that as the decontamination crews work on sections of the vertical buildings, their 
exposure rate contribution from the line source will be lower than if the radioactive 
material was concentrated in a point source.  
 All three filter bed options are acceptable in that each configuration presents a 
similar reduction in exposure rate.   The linear source configuration was selected for use 
as the post street decontamination exposure rate contribution when calculating the pre- 
and post- exposure rate values of the vertical sources because it has the lowest expected 
exposure rate and presents the operational advantage of shortening the wash distance.  
Table 11: Exposure Rates Post-Street Decontamination with Line HESCO Filter 
Bed Located along Building 1 (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total    
1 1.9 x 10-7 0.06 0.06 0.11 81.88% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 0.06 0.06 0.13 80.80% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 0.06 0.06 0.13 80.55% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 0.06 0.06 0.13 80.80% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 0.06 0.06 0.11 81.88% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 0.04 0.04 0.07 79.25% 
Vertical Area Source Decontamination 
 
  Each tested removal efficiency-- 80%, 50%, and 30% --was tested using two 
different filter bed options. For Tables 12-23 the exposure rate component for the street is 
modeled as having 100% of the street activity confined to a line source (Figure 15). For 
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Tables 12-17 the building 2 (brown building in diagrams) component is constant because 
that building still contains 100% of the radioactivity on the surface. In Tables 12-17 the 
only components that change are building one and the two filter bed options to contain 
the activity from building one. In Tables 18-23 the results of 100% street 
decontamination and decontamination of both buildings at 80, 50, and 30%.   
 The first option is a single HESCO Jackbox filter bed with a single line of 
Jackbox berms as shielding, depicted in Figure 14.  The second filter option is a linear 
source along the front of the building. For the linear source, it was assumed that the two 
linear filter beds would be set up prior to decontamination. This was modeled with the 
filter bed for the building on the inside separated from the filter bed for the street by a 
single HESCO berm shield and then another single HESCO berm shield outside of the 
street filter bed. This set up in shown in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16: Line Source in Front of Building 1 with Three Layers of HESCO Berm 
Shielding 
 
Tables 12 and 13 show the percent reduction in exposure rate following the 
decontamination of the street with 100% removal efficiency and building 1, the grey 
building in the diagrams, with 80% removal efficiency. Decontaminating building 1 with 
an 80% removal efficiency provides a roughly 5% increase in the exposure rate reduction 
over decontamination of just the street (Tables 10 and 11).  Both filter bed configurations, 
when shielded, reduce the exposure rate component from the filter bed (column 3) low 
enough, on the order of times 10-7 for the single filter bed and times 10-18 for the line 
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source, that there is no difference in the exposure rate percent reduction at 0.1% between 
the two options, shown in the right-hand columns of Tables 12 and 13.   
Table 12:  Exposure Rates Post-Decontamination of Building 1 Utilizing the 
Jackbox Filter Bed with 80% Removal Efficiency (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 4.1 x 10-8 0.01 0.06 0.07 89.14% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 1.2 x 10-7 0.01 0.06 0.08 88.49% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 6.7 x 10-7 0.01 0.06 0.08 88.34% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 6.7 x 10-7 0.01 0.06 0.08 88.49% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 1.2 x 10-7 0.01 0.06 0.07 89.14% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 4.1 x 10-8 0.01 0.04 0.04 87.56% 
 
 
Table 13: Exposure rates Post-Decontamination of Building 1 Utilizing Line Source 
Filter Bed with 80% Removal Efficiency (mR/hr) 
Point Street 1 Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total   % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 4.800E-18 0.01 0.06 0.07 89.14% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 4.800E-18 0.01 0.06 0.08 88.49% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 4.800E-18 0.01 0.06 0.08 88.34% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 4.800E-18 0.01 0.06 0.08 88.49% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 4.800E-18 0.01 0.06 0.07 89.14% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 4.800E-18 0.01 0.04 0.04 87.56% 
 
Tables 14 and 15 show the results of decontaminating the street with 100% 
removal efficiency and building 1 (grey building) with 50% removal efficiency.  The 
overall percent reduction in exposure rate only drops roughly 3% with a reduction in 
removal efficiency from 80 to 50%. The two filter bed options are the same center of 
street single HESCO bed and line source shown in Figures 14 and 16. A comparison of 
exposure rate contribution from the filter beds (third column) shows that the line source 
does provide a greater reduction in exposure rate over the single HESCO filter but they 
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are both so low that the filter bed contributions do not affect the total exposure rate at two 
significant figures.    
Table 14: Exposure Rates Post-Decontamination of Building 1 Utilizing the Jackbox 
Filter Bed with 50% Removal Efficiency (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 2.6 x 10-8 0.02 0.06 0.08 86.42% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 7.3 x 10-8 0.03 0.06 0.09 85.61% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 4.2 x 10-7 0.03 0.06 0.10 85.42% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 4.2 x 10-7 0.03 0.06 0.09 85.61% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 7.3 x 10-8 0.02 0.06 0.08 86.42% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 2.6 x 10-8 0.02 0.04 0.06 84.44% 
 
 
Table 15: Exposure Rates Post-Decontamination of Building 1 Utilizing a Line 
Source Filter Bed with 50% Removal Efficiency (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 2.2 x 10-18 0.03 0.06 0.08 86.42% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 2.1 x 10-18 0.03 0.06 0.09 85.61% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 2.1 x 10-18 0.03 0.06 0.10 85.42% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 2.1 x 10-18 0.03 0.06 0.09 85.61% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 2.1 x 10-18 0.03 0.06 0.08 86.42% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 1.1 x 10-18 0.02 0.04 0.05 84.44% 
 
A reduction in removal efficiency to 30% decreases the overall percent reduction 
by 1% from the 50% removal and 4% from the 80% removal. Tables 16 and 17 show the 
data for decontamination of the street at 100% removal efficiency and building 1 at 30% 
removal efficiency. Both filter bed configurations provide the same total percent 
reduction in exposure rate. 
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Table 16: Exposure Rates Post-Decontamination of Building 1 Utilizing the Jackbox 
Filter Bed with 30% Removal Efficiency (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 1.6 x 10-8 0.03 0.06 0.09 85.63% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 4.4 x 10-8 0.04 0.06 0.11 83.69% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 2.5 x 10-7 0.04 0.06 0.11 83.48% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 2.5 x 10-7 0.04 0.06 0.11 83.69% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 4.4 x 10-8 0.04 0.05 0.10 84.61% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 1.6 x 10-8 0.02 0.03 0.06 82.37% 
 
 
Table 17: Exposure rates Post-decontamination of building 1 utilizing a line source 
filter bed with 30% removal efficiency (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-18 0.03 0.06 0.09 85.63% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-18 0.04 0.06 0.11 83.69% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-18 0.04 0.06 0.11 83.48% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-18 0.04 0.06 0.11 83.69% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-18 0.04 0.06 0.10 84.61% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 1.6 x 10-18 0.02 0.04 0.06 82.37% 
 
Exposure Rate Following Decontamination 
 Tables 18 through 23 show the results of full decontamination of the street and 
both buildings, i.e., the results of combining the two steps. The percent reduction in 
exposure rate utilizing two filter bed configurations and three different removal 
efficiencies are displayed.  The maximum expected reduction in exposure rate is 96.40 %. 
The minimum expected reduction is 80.72%. However, that minimum percent reduction 
is based on location 6 that had the lowest exposure rate at the start.  The lowest expected 
reduction for the other five locations is 86.41%.  
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  Decontaminating the street provides the greatest reduction in exposure rate per 
unit of time. The street has the lowest surface area and does not require the use of ladders 
or special equipment to decontaminate.  Decontaminating the street, with 100% 
efficiency, offers a roughly 80% reduction in exposure rate with an expected range of 
decontamination time between  40 and 84 hours based on the wash rates between 40 and 
80 meters squared per hour. Decontaminating the vertical surfaces of the building only 
adds approximately 5 to 16% reduction in exposure rate while increasing the total 
operation time an estimated 80 to 160 hours. Figure 17 shows the average percent 
reduction for each option presented in tables 9-23. The first three bars are following the 
100% decontamination of the street. The middle six bars show the exposure rate percent 
reduction following 100% decontamination of the street and the decontamination of 
building 1 at the labeled removal efficiencies. The final six bars show the average total 
percent reduction in exposure rate post-decontamination, this includes the 100% 
decontamination of the street and the decontamination of buildings 1 and 2 at the labeled 
removal efficiencies. The information in parenthesis indicates which filter bed option was 
used for that model. The abbreviations are End of Street (EOB), Line Source (Line), and 
the single HESCO filter (Jackbox).  
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Figure 17: Comparison of Decontamination Options 
 
Table 18: Exposure Rates After Completion of Decontamination with 80% Removal 
Efficiency Using the Jackbox Filter Bed (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 8.3 x 10-8 0.01 0.01 0.02 96.40% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 2.3 x 10-7 0.01 0.01 0.02 96.18% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-6 0.01 0.01 0.03 96.13% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-6 0.01 0.01 0.02 96.18% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 2.3 x 10-7 0.01 0.01 0.02 96.40% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 8.3 x 10-8 0.01 0.01 0.01 95.87% 
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Table 19: Exposure Rates After Completion of Decontamination with 80% Removal 
Efficiency Using a Line Source Filter Bed (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 8.3 x 10-8 0.01 0.01 0.02 96.40% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 2.3 x 10-7 0.01 0.01 0.02 96.18% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-6 0.01 0.01 0.03 96.13% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-6 0.01 0.01 0.02 96.18% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 2.3 x 10-7 0.01 0.01 0.02 96.40% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 8.3 x 10-8 0.01 0.01 0.01 95.87% 
 
Table 20: Exposure Rates After Completion of Decontamination with 50% Removal 
Efficiency Using the Jackbox Filter Bed (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 5.2 x 10-8 0.03 0.03 0.06 90.95% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 1.5 x 10-8 0.03 0.03 0.06 90.41% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 8.3 x 10-7 0.03 0.03 0.06 90.29% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 8.3 x 10-7 0.03 0.03 0.06 90.41% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 1.5 x 10-8 0.03 0.03 0.06 90.95% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 5.2 x 10-8 0.02 0.02 0.04 89.64% 
 
Table 21: Exposure Rates After Completion of Decontamination with 50% Removal 
Efficiency Using a Line Source Filter Bed (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 5.2 x 10-8 0.03 0.03 0.06 90.95% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 1.5 x 10-8 0.03 0.03 0.06 90.41% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 8.3 x 10-7 0.03 0.03 0.06 90.29% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 8.3 x 10-7 0.03 0.03 0.06 90.41% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 1.5 x 10-8 0.03 0.03 0.06 90.95% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 5.2 x 10-8 0.02 0.02 0.04 89.64% 
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Table 22: Exposure rates after completion of decontamination with 30% removal 
efficiency using the Jackbox filter bed (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 3.1 x 10-8 0.03 0.03 0.07 89.39% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 8.8 x 10-8 0.04 0.04 0.09 86.58% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 5.0 x 10-7 0.04 0.04 0.09 86.41% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 5.0 x 10-7 0.04 0.04 0.09 86.58% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 8.8 x 10-8 0.04 0.04 0.08 87.33% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 3.1 x 10-8 0.02 0.02 0.05 85.50% 
 
 
Table 23: Exposure rates after completion of decontamination with 30% removal 
efficiency using a line source filter bed (mR/hr) 
Point Street  Filter bed Bldg 1 Bldg 2 Total  % reduction 
1 1.9 x 10-7 2.6 x 10-18 0.03 0.03 0.07 89.39% 
2 1.9 x 10-7 2.6 x 10-18 0.04 0.04 0.09 86.58% 
3 1.9 x 10-7 2.5 x 10-18 0.04 0.04 0.09 86.41% 
4 1.9 x 10-7 2.6 x 10-18 0.04 0.04 0.09 86.58% 
5 1.9 x 10-7 2.6 x 10-18 0.04 0.04 0.08 87.33% 
6 9.5 x 10-8 2.6 x 10-18 0.03 0.03 0.07 80.72% 
Estimated Total Exposure to Emergency Responders Utilizing the IWATERS 
 The average total exposure rate at each of the six dose points was found by 
averaging the pre- and post- exposure rates of each phase and then summing each phase. 
Table 24 shows the pre- and post- exposure rates in milliroentgen per hour for each of the 
three sources, the street, building 1 and building 2. The exposure contribution from the 
filter beds was assumed to be zero because once the radioactive material was contained in 
any of the filter bed alternatives, the exposure rates were below 10-5 and did not 
contribute to the final total after rounding to the hundredths place.  
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Table 24: Pre- and Post- Exposure Rates at Centerline of Street with 100% Removal 
from the Street and 80% Removal Efficiency from Buildings 1 and 2 (mR/hr) 
 
Street Exposure Bldg 1 Exposure Bldg 2 Exposure 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
1 0.51 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 
2 0.53 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 
3 0.53 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 
4 0.53 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 
5 0.51 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 
6 0.27 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 
Total Expected Exposure by Decontamination Phase 
 
Table 25 shows the average exposure rates by decontamination process. The street 
exposure values are comprised of the pre- and post- average exposure rates for the street 
plus the pre- exposure rates from buildings 1 and 2. This is because during the 
decontamination of the street each building still has 100% of the deposited 
contamination. The building 1 exposure rates include the post- street rate in addition to 
the average of the building 1 exposure rates and the pre- building two exposure rate. 
Finally, building two average exposure rate was found by adding the post- exposure rates 
from the street and building 1 to the average rate for building two.  
Table 25: Average Exposure Rate during Decontamination (mR/hr) 
Point Street Bldg 1  Bldg 2 
1 0.37 0.09 0.04 
2 0.39 0.10 0.05 
3 0.39 0.10 0.05 
4 0.39 0.10 0.05 
5 0.37 0.09 0.04 
6 0.21 0.06 0.03 
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As noted in the literature review, the recommended wash rate for the IWATERS 
system is between 40 and 80 m2/hr. Table 26 shows the exposure to personnel during 
each phase of the decontamination at the various wash rates.  
Table 26: Total Exposure by Decontamination Phase and Wash Rate (mR) 
 Total Exposure by Decontamination Phase and Wash Rate (mR) 
  Wash rate 40 m2/h  Wash rate 60 m2/h Wash rate 80 m2/h 
Point  Street  Bldg 
1 
Bldg 
2 
Street  Bldg 
1 
Bldg 
2 
Street  Bldg 
1 
Bldg 
2 
1 30.64 7.52 3.75 20.42 5.01 2.50 15.32 3.76 1.88 
2 32.56 8.39 4.19 21.71 5.59 2.79 16.28 4.19 2.09 
3 33.00 8.59 4.29 22.00 5.73 2.86 16.50 4.30 2.14 
4 32.56 8.39 4.19 21.71 5.59 2.79 16.28 4.19 2.09 
5 30.64 7.52 3.75 20.42 5.01 2.50 15.32 3.76 1.88 
6 17.24 4.74 2.37 11.49 3.16 1.58 8.62 2.37 1.18 
 
Table 27 combines all three sources and provides the total expected dose 
equivalent during decontamination of 46 North Canal Street utilizing line filter bed 
configurations and 80% removal efficiency of dry cesium. Table 28 is a breakdown of the 
expected dose equivalent per person based on how many eight-person crews are used 
during the decontamination process. The goal is to keep total dose equivalent below 5 
rem or 5,000 mrem per worker. The highest estimated dose equivalent at a single 
exposure point in the center of the street over the totality of the operation is 
approximately 46 mrem. The highest estimate dose equivalent for a single person is 
approximately 14 mrem.  
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Table 27: Total Dose Equivalent (mrem) at Various Wash Rates for the Entire 
Decontamination Operation at Fix Exposure Points 
Point 40 
m2/h 
60 
m2/h 
80 m2/h 
1 42 28 21 
2 45 30 23 
3 46 31 23 
4 45 30 23 
5 42 28 21 
6 24 16 12 
 
Table 28: Exposure (mrem) Per Person Based on Number of 8-Person Crews 
Required 
Wash 
rate 
Total 
shifts 
3 crews 4 crews 5 crews 6 crews 7 crews 8 crews 
40 m2/h 35 14 10 8 7 6 5 
60 m2/h 23 9 7 5 5 4 3 
80 m2/h 18 7 5 4 3 3 3 
 
Uncertainty Analysis 
 Uncertainty and variability are part of every risk characterization. The variability 
is the range of true values that can occur for a given situation. Uncertainty is a product of 
imperfect knowledge and introduced as a byproduct of assumptions [59]. The 
assumptions are required to complete the analysis, but each time a simplifying 
assumption is made it introduces uncertainty and bias. Table 29 is a summary of major 
assumptions discussed throughout the analysis and the potential direction of bias on the 
final exposure rate and dose equivalent estimate.  
 The primary goal of this research was to test filter bed options and establish initial 
exposure rate and dose estimates because of that some simplifying assumptions were 
made to leave out potential exposure pathways or routes that are predicted to be minor 
contributors to the overall exposure rate and dose. It is possible that real-world exposure 
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rates will be higher than the rates found in this research. There is currently a safety factor 
of 108 between the highest estimated dose equivalent and the occupational limit.  
 Selecting the high end of the expected activity concentration and using it as a 
uniform distribution will have mostly likely proved a high bias. The lack of activity 
hotspots will bias the results low. It is unknown which of these two assumptions will 
result in a greater magnitude of exposure rate and dose equivalent bias, or if they may 
even cancel each other out.  
 The density of the source and shielding material was fixed for all experiments in 
this analysis, but there is no way to predict future densities even if responders use the 
same ratio of sand to clay or even the same type of sand and vermiculite. Based on the 
output files from MicroShield, the difference between the exposure rates with and 
without buildup for the densities used is approximately 20 percent higher when buildup is 
included. Due to the fact that buildup factors are a correction to account for scattering, 
the uncertainty in exposure rate caused by a difference in the densities of shielding is 
predicted to be less than the difference between the exposure rates with and without 
buildup.     
 There will be some particles and ions are that resuspended in the air as a result of 
wind currents, decontamination operations, and general movement that will contribute to 
the exposure. The degree of resuspension is a product of multiple variables and will be 
unique to each situation. If the concentration of resuspended particles is known the 
derived air concentrations for Cs-137 from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can be 
used to estimate exposure rate and dose equivalent.    
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Table 29: Potential Bias of Assumptions 
Potential Uncertainty Direction of Bias 
External Gamma Only Low. Internal dose and charged particles were not included. 
Uniform high activity concentration High.  
Density of source and shield 
material 
Possibly high or low depending on the density of the real-world 
shielding compared to the model. 
Lack of hot spots Low. 
No back scatter Low. Direct beam buildup increases the exposure rate 20%. 
Back scatter is expected to be well below this value.  
No Resuspension Low.  
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V.  Conclusion 
 
 The Global War on Terror has been underway since 2001. The threat of terrorist 
attack using radiological dispersal devices has been recognized by the U.S. Congress. 
Recent events in Japan highlight the difficulties in decontaminating within the urban 
landscape. There is a clear and pressing need for the development of modern radiological 
decontamination strategies for the urban environment. One of the keys to effective long-
term remediation and recovery is immediate mitigation within a few days of the incident 
and before a rain event.  
 The IWATERS system provides a potentially safe and effective method for 
emergency responders to perform decontamination operations in urban areas. This 
research found that the total expected activity for a city block can be contained in filter 
beds small enough to fill onto a standard forklift pallet making movement and 
replacement easy.  
 The modular nature of the IWATERS means that the filter beds can be deployed 
in a variety of configurations. This research explored three options for horizontal area 
decontamination and two options for vertical area combinations and found that all options 
and combinations thereof provide sufficient reduction in exposure rate, so all can be used 
with similar confidence. The exposure rates for the different bed geometries are within 
0.1% of each other.  
 The stochastic nature of radiation health effects require that exposures are 
maintained ALARA. To help ensure low excess risk due to radiation exposure, federal 
laws provide exposure rate and dose equivalent limits of 2 mR per hour and 5 rem per 
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year. Using the IWATERS under the configuration of this research maintains exposure 
rates and dose equivalents below federal standards and provides potentially over 80 
percent reduction of exposure rate post decontamination.  
Future Research 
 This analysis does not account for exposure from charged particles nor 
resuspension of radioactive material. To provide a more accurate estimate of exposure 
and dose to emergency responses, research needs to be accomplished in these areas. 
Another avenue of research to refine the accuracy would be the inclusion of particle 
deposition distribution. To study these effects, a more advanced software than 
MicroShield is required.  
If an estimated geometric mean and standard deviation of RDD dispersed 
particles is obtained, then a Monte Carlo simulation of activity concentration can be 
accomplished. Using the MicroShield software will always present the limitation of the 
uniform source concentration; however, if the probability of certain area concentration is 
known, then the software can generate exposure rates at a fixed point from the high end 
of the distribution to the low end using the sensitivity analysis. Once that is complete, the 
exposure rates can be given a probability of occurring in order to generate a post hoc 
exposure rate distribution.  
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Appendix A: MicroShield Excel Output Files  
 
Pre-Decontamination 
 
 
Vertical Area 
Pre-Decontaminatio
Horizontal Area 
Pre-Decontaminatio 
Decontamination of Street  
 
Line Source 100%_ 
Street Removal.xls
Single HESCO in 
Middle of Street 100
Single HESCO at 
End of Street 100%_ 
Decontamination of Building 1 
 
HESCO point filter 
30_ removal from bld
Hesco line filter 
bed after 30_ remova
HESCO point filter 
in street center after
HESCO point filter 
center of street after
HESCO point 
filter_center of stree
HESCO Line filter 
after 80_ removal fro 
Post Decontamination  
 
Vertical Area source 
after 30_ activity rem
HESCO point 80_ 
removal.msd.xls
Hesco line 50_ 
removal_3 Shields.xl
Hesco line 50_ 
removal_0_1858Ci.xls
Hesco line 30_ 
removal.xls
vertical area source 
after 80_ activity rem
Vertical area source 
after 50_ activity rem 
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Filter Bed Testing  
 
Floodline no 
shielding.xls
Filter Bed with 
R_47cm.xls
CART_shielding.xls CART no 
shielding.xls
55G_Barrel_0_186Ci
_200m.xls
55G_Barrel_0_186Ci.
xls
Width Sensitivity.xls waterline x 
sensitivity.xls
Water line.xls Jackox no 
shielding.xls
HESCO CART 
w_shielding 1_20m.x 
 
Notebook 
 
 The file is the master spreadsheet for this research. This notebook contains all 
information that went into the final analysis. It also contains information from other runs 
and aborted analysis.   
Sanders Thesis.xlsx
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